Headquarters Daily report SEPTEMBER 20, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I SEPTEMBER 20, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New Hampshire Yankee MR Number: 1-94-0108 Seabrook 1 Date: 09/19/94 Manchester,New Hampshire SRI Dockets: 50-443 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: Sensitized Stainless Steel Bolting in Service Water Pumps Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: During the third refueling outage at Seabrook Station (April-July), divers in the cooling tower basin visually identified two corroded flange bolts on one service water pump. Both of these bolts, along with one from an ocean service water pump, were sent out for analysis. The metallurgical evaluation found that the pump column flange bolts were not properly solution annealed in accordance with the ASME SA-193 material requirements. The lack of proper heat treatment resulted in sensitization of the stainless steel bolt material. While the mechanical properties of the bolts were not adversely affected, the sensitization reduced the corrosion resistance of the material, particularly in an aqueous environment. The pump manufacturer, Johnston Turbine Pumps, supplied all six service water pumps to Seabrook Station. Each cooling tower service water pump has a total of 144 one-inch diameter SA-193, B8M bolts (six flanges with 24 bolts per flange), while each ocean service water pump has a total of 140 one-inch diameter SA-193, B8M bolts (seven flanges with 20 bolts per flange). The bolts in question were supplied by a distributor, California Nut and Bolt, with a Certificate of Compliance (versus a certified material test report, which would be required by the ASME Code for fasteners larger than one-inch in diameter) establishing the requisite documentation of compliance to the material specifications. The original bolt supplier to California Nut and Bolt is not known at the present time. The licensee intends to initiate replacement of all the questionable bolts on the wetted flanges of all six service water system pumps after acceptable lot testing of the new bolt supply. The corrective maintenance activities may commence as early as September 27. Other licensee corrective actions include programmatic reviews of this issue for 10 CFR 21 and Nuclear Network reporting, and evaluation of other bolting supplied by California Nut and Bolt to Johnston Pumps. The licensee is also evaluating other equipment repairs conducted during the outage for similar corrective response concerns. The licensee also intends to submit a voluntary LER to the NRC to further discuss and document this problem. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are assessing the continuing licensee evaluations and plans for corrective actions. The NRR project manager is onsite, has been briefed on this issue and has informed the Vendor Inspection Branch, relative to generic concerns. NRC inspection of the corrective maintenance/bolt replacement activities is planned. Contact: John Rogge (610)337-5146 Antone Cerne (508)747-0565 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III SEPTEMBER 20, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-94-0163 Dresden 1 2 3 Date: 09/16/94 Morris,Illinois TELECOM TO NRC OPS CTR. Dockets: 50-010,50-237,50-249 BWR/GE-1,BWR/GE-3,BWR/GE-3 Subject: LICENSEE SUPERVISOR - POSITIVE DRUG TEST Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: A licensee electrical maintenance supervisor tested positive for cocaine on a for-cause test conducted on September 12, 1994. A for-cause test was conducted after an odor of alcohol was detected on the individual's breath during a medical examination conducted after a four week medical leave of absence. Alcohol test result was negative. The individual's site access was denied. A work performance analysis will be conducted. The individual will be entering a employee assistance program. Regional Action: None Contact: J. CREED (708)829-9857 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV SEPTEMBER 20, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Southern California Edison & San MR Number: 4-94-0102 Diego Gas & Electric Co. Date: 09/19/94 San Onofre 3 SRI San Clemente,California Dockets: 50-362 PWR/CE Subject: AFW TURBINE TRIP THROTTLE VALVE DEFECT Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Morning Report (MR) 3-94-0146, "Part 21 Notification - Davis-Besse AFW Turbine Trip Throttle Valve," dated August 11, 1994, identified a defect associated with auxiliary feedwater (AFW) turbine trip throttle valves (TTVs). The absence of a detent in the TTV stem at Davis Besse allowed the setscrew to slip from its installed position, which prevented the TTV from opening fully during surveillance testing. The resident inspector at San Onofre provided the information from this MR to the licensee. On September 14, 1994, the licensee at San Onofre inspected the Unit 3 AFW turbine TTV and discovered that the TTV stem did not have an indentation in the stem to accept the setscrew used to anchor the valve stem coupling to the TTV stem. During this inspection, the inspector observed that the setscrew had engaged the TTV stem threads and had crushed some of the threads. The coupling was in the proper position on the stem. The licensee indented the stem and reinstalled the setscrew. The licensee plans to perform an inspection of the Unit 2 TTV the week of September 19, 1994. Regional Action: The resident inspectors had monitored the licensee's inspection of the Unit 3 TTV and will monitor the licensee's inspection of the Unit 2 TTV. Contact: D. Solorio (714)492-2641 J. Sloan (714)492-2641 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV SEPTEMBER 20, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Houston Lighting & Power Co. MR Number: 4-94-0103 South Texas 1 Date: 09/20/94 Wadsworth,Texas SRI Dockets: 50-498 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: REACTOR TRIP Reportable Event Number: 27801 Discussion: At 1:05 a.m. on September 20, 1994, the reactor/turbine on Unit 1 automatically tripped. A Steam Generator 1C lo-lo level signal generated the reactor/turbine trip. This ended a 182-day run. As previously reported, Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pump 13 tripped immediately prior to the reactor/turbine trip. The startup feedwater pump automatically started. Operators attempted to compensate for the loss of the main feedwater pump by adjusting power down and manually controlling steam generator level. The level recorder for Steam Generator 1C apparently hung up at approximately 36.5 percent. The operators believed the plant to be stabilizing, while the actual level in Steam Generator 1C decreased to 33 percent, the lo-lo level trip setpoint. The Control Bank D, Rod M4 rod bottom light did not fully illuminate following the reactor trip. The licensee subsequently determined that a dust ball inside the digital rod position indication panel partially obscured the rod bottom light. The licensee continues to investigate the cause of the following equipment failures: (1) Main Feedwater Pump 13 tripped on overspeed which initiated the event. (2) The recirculation valve for the startup feedwater pump did not fully close after the pump received an auto start signal. (3) The level recorder for Steam Generator 1C hung up at approximately 36.5 percent. (4) Subsequent to the event, the licensee identified a broken stainless steel flex tube used to control the bypass feedwater isolation valve in the feedwater header to Steam Generator C. (5) Subsequent to the event, Main Feedwater Pump 12 was placed on the turning gear. However, after some time on the turning gear, the pump seized and disengaged from the turning gear. Regional Action: The resident inspectors responded to the site and monitored the licensee's posttrip activities. Additional followup inspection will be performed prior to restart. Contact: William D. Johnson (817)860-8148