Headquarters Daily report SEPTEMBER 01, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION SEPTEMBER 1, 1994 MR Number: H-94-0077 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT Subject: Loss of Foreign Material into Reactor Vessel The NRR/AEOD Events Assessment Panel on August 30, 1994, classified the loss of foreign material into the reactor vessel as a Significant Event. The classification was based upon programmatic deficiencies. The licensee was in the process of reassembling the reactor vessel following the refueling outage when a moveable service platform sheared the power cord of two underwater lights. The power cords were sheared during different shifts. The licensee tried to retrieve the lights with a 30 foot pole and net. One light was retrieved, but the other one fell into the annulus region of the reactor vessel near the suction to the reactor recirculation pump "A". During this time the residual heat removal (RHR) pump was running. The licensee removed the steam separator and used a small remote submersible camera (about the size of a football) to try to locate the dropped light. In removing the steam separator, one of 36 holddown bolts was not rotated to the correct position to unlock the tee bar. When attempting to lift the 73.5 ton moisture separator, it got snagged on the tee bar. The crane load cell indicated about 100 tons before the lift was stopped and the problem corrected. The licensee did not locate the light with the submersible camera. Believing the light was either in the recirculation loop or in the RHR system, a loose part analysis was performed that showed that if the light was not retrieved it would not damage the reactor vessel. When the RHR pump was started, an operator in the pump room reported the pump vibrated more than usual and made a noise. A few minutes later, another operator reported noise in the RHR piping. The licensee disassembled the RHR pump and located the missing light just before the first stage of the pump impeller. The light was virtually intact, except for a missing triangular shape piece of plexiglass (about 18 square inches). The licensee reassembled the RHR pump without finding the missing plexiglass. This event appears to demonstrate programmatic deficiencies in the licensee management of the plant. The event was briefed June 22, 1994, Operating Reactor Events Briefing 94-22, "Loss of Foreign Material into Reactor Vessel." CONTACT: Thomas A. Greene, NRR/DORS/OEAB (301) 504-1175 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I SEPTEMBER 1, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-94-0098 Salem 1 Date: 09/01/94 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-272 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: CONDENSATE SUCTION HEADER DAMAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On August 24, at about 9:15 a.m., Unit 1 operators began a rapid shutdown from 100 per cent power in response to damage that a system engineer discovered in part of the condensate suction header. Operators achieved Mode 2 (Startup) shortly after 12 noon. Equipment operators were removing No. 12 condensate pump from service to replace the mechanical seal. Per procedure, they stopped the pump, isolated the pump recirculation line, closed the discharge valve and its bypass valve, and were in the process of closing the suction valve. When the operator closed the suction valve, the pump expansion joint over pressurized and began leaking. Subsequent investigation revealed that back leakage through the discharge bypass valve and discharge check valve had pressurized the suction line, well beyond system design. Consequently, the suction header experienced a very large axial force due to the large differential pressure across the suction valve. This valve, a 30 inch gate valve, was subjected to a back pressure of 200 psig on the pump side and a vacuum on its suction side, resulting in a 130,000 pound force applied to the piping system on the suction side of the condensate pump. This force shoved the upstream section of piping about 2 inches, breaking the suction header anchor pedestal and deforming two other expansion joints. No other condensate system components, outside the expansion joints, were affected when the header shifted. Licensee engineering calculations for the loading developed by 130,000 lbs. force was consistent with the observed anchor pedestal damage and closely matched the observed pipe support skid displacement. The as-found condition of the gage used to monitor suction pressure indicated it had been over-ranged by the pressure transient. Engineers observed that the needle wound clockwise (increasing pressure) past its limit pin. The as-found condition of the discharge bypass valve revealed the disc was broken off its stem; which resulted in the back leakage. The licensee repaired all damaged components, established corrective actions to prevent recurrence, and returned the condensate system to service on August 29. Currently, the unit is in Mode 2, and expects to be synchronized to the grid by September 1. Further, the licensee verified the operability and function of other portions of the condensate system, including similar components and structures in Salem Unit 2. Regional Action: The inspector responded to the condensate bay, observed the damaged anchor pedestal and deformed expansion joints, and monitored the plant shutdown. The inspector also reviewed and assessed licensee's event analysis, and inspected certain repair activities. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I SEPTEMBER 1, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: None MR Number: 1-94-0099 None Date: 08/29/94 Subject: RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN THE BASEMENT OF HOME IN HAVERFORD, PA Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On August 29, 1994, Limerick Nuclear Power Plant notified Region I that a women called and stated that her grandfather had worked with the Manhattan Project as a Director of Research for Westinghouse. She also stated that in the basement of her grandfather's home in Haverford, PA, was a five gallon tin container that was thought to contain radioactive material from the Project and that a geiger counter which was also in the basement determined that there was radioactivity coming from the five gallon container. Both grandparents died and the grandchildren are currently in the process of selling the estate. On August 29, 1994, and again on August 31, 1994, accompanied by a State inspector from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Region I visited the estate at 508 Avonwood Lane, Haverford, PA, to investigate the five gallon container. The container was located on the floor of the basement with its lid taped shut. Radiation measurements indicated 10 mr/hr on contact with the container and 1.5 mr/hr at a distance of one foot with the use of a Ludlum Model 3, geiger counter. The State inspector measured 2000 cpm with the use of his Ludlum alpha survey meter. Inside of the container were several quart mason jars containing test tubes, minerals, metal and glass plates, and other laboratory utensils. A contamination survey was performed on the outside and inside of the container and indicated no removable contamination with the use of the Ludlum survey instruments. The wipes were transfered to the Region I laboratory for detailed analysis. Region I also performed an isotopic analysis with the use of a multichannel analyzer which indicated the possibility that the items found in the container and in a rock collection located in the basement to contain thorium and its daughters. Regional Action: Region I will perform a more detail analysis of the wipes and the results of the multichannel analyzer. The Environmental Protection Agency will be contacted if it is verified that the contents of the container is source material. Contact: R. GIBSON, JR. (610)337-5071 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III SEPTEMBER 1, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-94-0155 Quad Cities 1 Date: 08/30/94 Cordova,Illinois SRI Dockets: 50-254 BWR/GE-3 Subject: CONTROL ROD FAILED TO SCRAM Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On August 29, 1994, the licensee was performing control rod scram time testing at 20 percent power. One control rod failed to scram on demand. Licensee investigation showed that a 1/2 inch pipe plug was installed in the vent pipe of the respective scram solenoid valve. The pipe was believed to be installed during the recent refueling outage. The licensee is still investigating the source of the pipe plug. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will follow-up. Contact: PAT HILAND (708)829-9603 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV SEPTEMBER 1, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Nebraska Public Power District MR Number: 4-94-0089 Cooper 1 Date: 09/01/94 Brownsville,Nebraska Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-298 BWR/GE-4 Subject: INJURED EMPLOYEE TRANSPORTED TO COUNTY HOSPITAL Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On August 30, 1994, a licensee engineer performing inspection in the reactor building fell from a scaffolding ladder approximately 10 feet to a concrete floor. The individual received assistance from the licensee's emergency medical team but was able to walk away from the accident. The individual was transported by a licensee vehicle to the Nemaha County Hospital in Auburn, Nebraska. The individual was treated and released and returned to work on August 31, 1994. The unit has been shut down since May 25, 1994. The individual was not contaminated. The licensee issued a press release. Regional Action: None planned. Contact: T. Reis (817)860-8185 P. H. Harrell (817)860-8250