Headquarters Daily report AUGUST 16, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS AUGUST 16, 1994 MR Number: H-94-0072 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH/EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Subject: N/A NRC Information Notice 94-57, "Debris in Containment and the Residual Heat Removal System," was issued August 12, 1994. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to the problem associated with debris recently discovered in the containment and the residual heat removal (RHR) system at some BWR sites. Technical contacts: Robert B. Elliott, NRR (301) 504-1397 Amy E. Cubbage, NRR (301) 504-2875 NRC Information Notice 94-58, "Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil Fire," will be issued August 16, 1994. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to a problem that may exist with the oil collection system for the lube oil system components of reactor coolant pumps. Technical contacts: Edward A. Connell, NRR (301) 504-2838 Ralph J. Paolino, RI (610) 337-5285 NRC Information Notice 94-59, "Accelerated Dealloying of Cast Aluminum-Bronze Valves Caused by Microbiologically Induced Corrosion," will be issued August 17, 1994. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to the potential consequences of increased corrosion rates in aluminum-bronze valves in service water systems when microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC) is present. Technical contacts: John W. York, RII (404) 331-5536 Morris W. Branch, RII (804) 357-2101 Geoffrey P. Hornseth, NRR (301) 504-2756 NRC Administrative Letter 94-10, "Distribution of NUREG-1478, `Non-power Reactor Operator Licensing Examiner Standards'," to be issued August 17, 1994. The NRC is issuing this administrative letter to inform all holders of operator and senior operator licenses at test and research reactors that the NRC has issued and distributed NUREG-1478, "Non-Power Reactor Licensing Examiner Standards." Contact: Warren Eresian, NRR (301) 504-1833 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I AUGUST 16, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Consolidated Edison Co. Of N.Y. MR Number: 1-94-0092 Indian Point 2 Date: 08/12/94 Buchanan,New York SRI Dockets: 50-247 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Mr. M. Miele, General Manager of Technical Services at Indian Point 2 was reassigned as the General Manager, Energy Control Center effective August 15, 1994. The energy control center is outside the nuclear organization. Mr. Miele's replacement has not been announced. Regional Action: Information only. Contact: Gordon Hunegs (914)739-9360 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III AUGUST 16, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Atec Associates Inc. MR Number: 3-94-0147 Atec Associates, Inc. Date: 08/16/94 Cicinnati,Ohio TELECON FROM ATEC ON AUG 13 TO NRC Dockets: 03017324 License No: 34-18893-01 Subject: DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On Saturday, August 13, 1994, at approximately 11:00 a.m., a Troxler moisture/density gauge belonging to ATEC Associates, Inc. of Cincinnati, Ohio was struck by an earth moving scraper. The gauge operator was 30 to 35 feet away from the gauge when the earth mover struck the device. The device contained two sealed sources, 8 millicuries (296 megabequerels) Cs-137 and 40 millicuries (1480 megabequerels) Am-241. The operator roped off the area around the gauge, and attempted to contact the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). Since neither the RSO or assistant RSO was available at the time, the operator contacted Troxler's 24 hour emergency number and requested assistance. The gauge's case was slightly cracked, and its handle was slightly turned. The source rod was locked in the safe position and remained in the safe position after the accident. After consulting with a Troxler representative, the operator transported the gauge to the licensee's facility in Cincinnati. Radiation measurements made at the surface of the gauge by the Assistant RSO using GM survey instrumentation indicated 10 mR/hr (2.5 microcoulomb/kilogram/hr). Preliminary wipe tests results indicated no removable contamination. The gauge will be returned to Troxler for repair upon complete analysis of the wipe test samples. Regional Action: NMSS and the State of Ohio have been notified. Region III will review the incident during a special inspection. Contact: B.J. HOLT (708)829-9836 D.R. GIBBONS (708)829-9843 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV AUGUST 16, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Nebraska Public Power District MR Number: 4-94-0079 Cooper 1 Date: 08/16/94 Brownsville,Nebraska SRI TELECON Dockets: 50-298 BWR/GE-4 Subject: SYSTEM VALVE LINEUPS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: This report updates Morning Report 4-94-0078, dated August 11, 1994. The licensee continues to perform system walkdowns to verify that valves are in the position specified on the valve checklist. As a result, the licensee has identified 7 additional valves, since the last issuance of a morning report, that were found to be out of position (i.e., not in the position specified on the checklist). The valves are in the feedwater and radioactive waste systems. The mispositioned valves did not affect system operability. This brings the total number of valves identified as out-of-position to 35. The licensee recently increased the scope of this effort to include verification of the accuracy of the checklist by comparison of the checklists to the as-built plant and to walkdown 100 percent of the plant systems (i.e., all safety- and nonsafety-related systems). Regional Action: Routine followup by resident inspectors. Contact: Phillip Harrell (817)860-8250 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I AUGUST 16, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New Hampshire Yankee MR Number: 1-94-0093 Seabrook 1 Date: 08/16/94 Manchester,New Hampshire SRI E-MAIL Dockets: 50-443 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: LOSS OF SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 10:38 a.m. on August 11, the licensee identified an inadvertent heatup of spent fuel (SF) pool water due to a configuration control error. The valve mispositioning occurred during a valve packing adjustment made on August 10. Operators had been alerted to a SF cooling pump discharge flow low alarm on that date, but did not investigate the cause of the alarm until August 11. The control room has a spent fuel pool temperature indicator available, but it was not routinely read or logged. Investigation found the "A" SF cooling pump outlet valve, SF-V-73, in the closed position vice the normal open position. The operators immediately opened SF-V-73 to establish proper cooling. The "A" SF cooling pump operated at essentially shutoff head and SF pool water temperature increased from 90 to 120 degrees F during the 24 hour period that the valve was out of position. There was no damage to the "A" SF cooling pump apparently due to leakage past the outlet valve. Review of this event by the resident inspector confirmed no adverse safety consequence. The administrative temperature limit for the SF pool water is 125 degrees F. A temperature alarm at 140 degrees F would have alerted the operators to high SF pool demineralizer temperature. The "B" SF cooling pump was available to be placed into operation. A temperature alarm at 160 degrees F would have alerted the operators to high-high SF pool water temperature. The Seabrook Technical Specifications do not contain any limits for SF pool water temperature. The SF pool contains 280,000 gallons of water, which provides an adequate heat sink during a loss of cooling for brief durations. Further, the SF cooling system is designed to operate up to 200 degrees F and 150 psig. The licensee has implemented several corrective actions in response to this event. All valves with packing being adjusted will have their positions independently verified at the completion of the adjustment. The as left position will be specified by the work control coordinator, who is a licensed senior reactor operator. Shift superintendents must review all active alarms to ensure they understand the reason for each alarm. The operations department manager must periodically assess the status of existing alarms. The licensee's followup review of this event will also include a human performance evaluation system (HPES) evaluation. Regional Action: Resident inspectors to assess the effectiveness of these corrective actions during routine inspection activities. Contact: Richard Laura (603)474-3589 Tracy Walker (610)337-5381