Headquarters Daily report AUGUST 05, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I AUGUST 5, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-94-0089 Salem 2 Date: 08/05/94 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-311 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: REACTOR TRIP BREAKER AND ROD CONTROL PROBLEMS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On 8/4 at 7:40 p.m., technicians began a monthly operability surveillance of the 'B' reactor trip breaker (RTB). Although the under-voltage function performed normally, the breaker exceeded the time response acceptance criteria for the shunt trip function (60 vs 11 cycles). In addition, the breaker closed slowly after testing. Operators declared the breaker inoperable and at 9:55 p.m. initiated a plant shutdown in accordance with the action specified by Technical Specification 3.3.1.1. Technicians removed the breaker, installed the bypass breaker from the 'A' RTB cubicle, and performed a surveillance to demonstrate the operability of the RTB installed in the 'B' RTB position. At 1:50 a.m. on 8/5, technicians completed the surveillance with satisfactory results, and operators terminated the power reduction at approximately 44% power. Technicians planned to troubleshoot the breaker removed from the 'B' RTB position to determine the cause of the failure. As of 7:00 a.m. on 8/5, Salem unit 2 was at 67% power, increasing at 5% per hour. During the problems with the RTB, and periodically since 5/30, operators have intermittently experienced a group of rods (Bank D, Group 2, 5 Rods) stepping in (by one step only) with no apparent input that would generate a demand for rod movement. Since 5/30, similar occurrences have been observed on 6/12, 6/23, 7/20, the weekend of 7/23, the weekend of 7/30, and 8/4. Each time stepping occurred, operators put the rods in manual, withdrew the rods to the full out position (one step), and returned the control to automatic. The same 5 rods moved each time. Maintenance staff hooked up signal recorders to suspected rod control circuits on 5/31. When the rod stepping occurred on 6/12, no spiking was indicated on the recorder. The recorder displayed spikes for the stepping on 6/23, 7/20, and the weekend of 7/23. Maintenance staff developed a troubleshooting plan from 7/25 to 7/29, and initiated the effort on 8/3. From that effort, on 8/4 the licensee determined that a 300 millivolt noise signal on the output of the summator has combined with spikes from auctioneered high nuclear power. The combined signals generate rod motion with no indication to the operator of the demand signal. The licensee determined that the noise signal on the output of the summator is excessive, and is working to eliminate it by replacing the summator. All control rods are full out and in manual control at the present time. These problems, based on current data from the licensee, are not the same as the problems experienced in June 1993 (A previous AIT) Regional Action: The resident inspector is onsite monitoring licensee activities. Contact: John White (610)337-5114 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III AUGUST 5, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Non-Licensee MR Number: 3-94-0141 Bfi Date: 08/01/94 Indianapolis,Indiana TELECON FROM BFI AND STATE OF IN Subject: RADIATION ALARM ON INCOMING WASTE SHIPMENT Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Region III was informed by representatives of Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) and the State of Indiana that a truck containing residential and commercial waste caused the radiation monitoring system to alarm at the city incinerator located in Indianapolis, Indiana on July 28, 1994. Radiation levels near the surface of the truck measured 440 microR/hr on July 29, 1994. The waste, which was hauled by BFI, was rejected by the incinerator staff and subsequently transported to another BFI facility in Indianapolis. The truck was segregated and roped off by BFI staff. Representatives of the State of Indiana radiation control program responded to BFI's request for assistance on July 29, 1994. Using a portable gama spectrometer, it was determined that the waste was contaminated with iodine-131. Subsequent measurements on August 1, 1994, indicated a maximum radiation level of 370 microR/hr. On August 4, 1994, while surveying the contents of the truck the State of Indiana discovered a vial of 9% saline solution contaminated with iodine-131. The radiation levels measured 4 millirem per hour from the surface of the vial. The contaminated vial and other waste was traced to Premier Radiopharmacy in Indianapolis. A representative from the radiopharmacy will retrieve the waste and return it to storage at the radiopharmacy. Regional Action: NMSS was informed. Region III will perform a followup inspection at Premier Radiopharmacy to review the circumstances surrounding this matter. Contact: B.J. HOLT (708)829-9836 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III AUGUST 5, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-94-0142 Dresden 3 Date: 08/05/94 Morris,Illinois RI Dockets: 50-249 BWR/GE-3 Subject: START-UP OF UNIT 3 ARTER REFUELING OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On August 5, 1994, at approximately 0530 (CDT), Unit 3 was taken critical and is expected to be synchronized to the electrical grid on August 7. The unit was shut down on March 9 for the thirteenth refueling outage. The outage scope included several control rod drive rebuilds, reactor vessel water level indication system modification, motor operated valve (MOV) modifications, high pressure coolant injection turbine overhaul, and significant work on the containment cooling service water system. During an inspection of the core shroud, the licensee identified cracking at the H5 weld area around the entire circumference of the shroud (See PNO-111-94-032). The licensee's analysis showed that the shroud still met design criteria. On July 21, 1994, the NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report and concluded that the cracked shroud will satisfy ASME code margins against weld failure for 15 months of operation above cold shutdown. The licensee is required to submit additional confirmatory analysis by December 15, 1994 to support continued operation. Regional Action: The residents observed start-up activities including the drywell closure inspection, start-up testing, and management oversight. Contact: P.L. HILAND (708)829-9603 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III AUGUST 5, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-94-0143 Prairie Island 1 Date: 08/05/94 Welch,Minnesota RI PC Dockets: 50-282 PWR/W-2-LP Subject: SHUTDOWN DUE TO LEAKAGE ON REACTOR VESSEL HEAD Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 2:23 a.m. (CST) on August 5, 1994, a unit shutdown commenced due to leakage identified on the reactor vessel head. Earlier in the evening, the licensee commenced a power reduction to 15 percent to make a containment entry to determine the source of a .177 gallon per minute (GPM) unidentified leakage. The Technical Specification limit for unidentified leakage is 1 GPM. At approximately 2 a.m., the licensee identified the reactor vessel head as the source of the leakage. However, at this time, the licensee does not know the specific cause of the leakage. Unit 1 is presently in hot shutdown and will proceed to cold shutdown to repair the leak. Regional Action: The residents will monitor the licensee's investigation and repairs. Contact: W. KROPP (708)790-9633 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III AUGUST 5, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-94-0144 Monticello 1 Date: 08/04/94 Monticello,Minnesota RESIDENT INSPECTOR TELECON Dockets: 50-263 BWR/GE-3 Subject: IMPROPER CRANE OPERATION CAUSED DAMAGE TO REFUELING TOOL Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On August 4, 1994, while inspecting and channeling new fuel, improper auxiliary crane operation caused damage to the channeling tool and loss of some parts. The licensee had just completed channeling two new fuel bundles and was raising the channeling tool up out of the way of the reactor building auxiliary crane with the small winch used for hoisting channels. The crane operator started to move the auxiliary crane to the fuel inspection stand in preparation for moving the fuel to the spent fuel pool. However, the operators did not verify that the channel hoist was completely clear of the crane and the hoist rope became caught somewhere on the crane. The movement of the crane caused the channeling tool and counterweight to be torn from the hoist rope and thrown aside. Upon hearing the noise, operators immediately stopped crane movement and checked the surface of the spent fuel pool to ensure that no parts had dropped into the water. A search was conducted for the channeling tool and counterweight. Pieces of the channeling tool were found on the refueling level floor, building girders, and crane mechanism. Despite a thorough search, a small part of the channeling tool locking pin and part of the channeling tool eye bolt and attachment bracket could not be found. The licensee stopped fuel inspection activities, replaced the channeling tool, counseled the crane operators and supervisors, and then restarted new fuel inspection. Regional Action: The resident inspectors were both present on the refueling floor at the time of the incident and monitored the licensee's efforts to find the missing parts and implement corrective actions. They will continue to inspect the licensee's new fuel inspection activities. Contact: M.P. PHILLIPS (708)829-9637