Headquarters Daily report JULY 27, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JULY 27, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Duquesne Light Co. MR Number: 1-94-0082 Beaver Valley 1 Date: 07/27/94 Shippingport,Pennsylvania RI PC Dockets: 50-334 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED PLANT MODE CHANGE DUE TO LOW RIVER WATER SYSTEM FLOW RATE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On July 25, during a routine ASME surveillance test, the `C' river water pump did not meet the required flow criteria when aligned to the `A' river water header. The `A' river water pump was subsequently aligned to the `A' header, and also failed to meet the ASME flow criteria. The `A' river water header was declared inoperable at 1600 on July 25. The licensee believes that the reduced flow in the `A' river water header is due to fouling of the `C' recirculation spray heat exchanger (RSHX). River water flow through the RSHXs is greater than the technical specification minimum of 8000 gpm. The heat exchanger is in containment, thus the plant must enter Mode 5 to break containment vacuum and clean the heat exchanger. The plant was in Mode 3 at the time of the event because of a transformer failure and reactor trip on July 19 (see Event Number 27552). Plant cooldown was started at 11:26 p.m. on July 25, and Mode 5 was entered at 6:06 p.m. on July 26. Prior to this event, the licensee expected to return the plant to power around July 30, following repair of the main transformer. Cleaning the `C' recirculation spray heat exchanger is expected to add about 5 days to the previous restart schedule. The licensee previously shutdown the plant in October 1991 and January 1994 because of fouling in the recirculation spray heat exchangers. This past fouling has been attributed to corrosion products and asiatic clams that accumulate in a dead leg portion of the river water piping and are swept into the RSHXs during river water pump surveillance testing. The licensee has been flushing and testing the RSHXs on a monthly basis since January 1994 and plans to continue this for the remainder of the operating cycle and install a permanent flush line during the next refueling outage in October 1994. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are following the licensee's activities, and will evaluate the effectiveness of the flushing and monitoring program established by the licensee. Contact: Scot Greenlee (412)643-2000 William Lazarus (610)337-5231 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JULY 27, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-94-0083 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 07/27/94 Wiscasset,Maine SRI PC Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: STEAM GENERATOR TUBES CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKS Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The plant was shutdown on July 16, 1994 due to increasing primary to secondary leakage (MR Number 1-94-0079). Prior to the shutdown, the plant had determined that the leakage was occurring from steam generator (S/G) Number 2. After the shutdown, a low pressure tube leak test of S/G 2 was performed on July 20, 1994 at about 170 psig. Four (4) tubes on the hot leg side leaked. Follow-up Eddy Current Test (ECT) using the Magnetic Rotating Pancake Coil (MRPC) method showed that the four leaking tubes had circumferential cracks in the areas just above the tube sheet region in the hot leg. The preliminary results of the leak test and ECT are as follows: Tube Location Leakage Extent of Crack Max. Depth of Crack 89-46 1 drop/2sec Circ, 262 degrees 94% through wall 49-122 1 drop/55sec Circ, 360 degrees 94% through wall 81-72 1 drop/20min Circ, 181 degrees 92% through wall 49-126 wet trace Circ, 132 degrees 95% through wall While this information was confirmed by the licensee, it is preliminary and was still undergoing further reviews by the licensee and Combustion Engineering. The licensee has embarked on a 100% MRPC inspection of the hot leg tubes of all three (3) steam generators in the vicinity of the tube sheet. As of Tuesday afternoon, July 26, 1994, the status of the inspections was as follows: Steam Generator Tubes Inspected Results Analyzed Pluggable No. 1 (5598 tubes) 1354 100 3 No. 2 (5635 tubes) 3852 2396 23 No. 3 (5611 tubes) 338 0 0 The shutdown is expected to extend until August 9, 1994. Regional Action: Region based inspectors will be on site July 28-29, 1994. The resident inspectors are monitoring licensee's test activities. Contact: Jimi Yerokun (207)882-7519 William Lazarus (610)337-5231 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JULY 27, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Duquesne Light Co. MR Number: 1-94-0084 Beaver Valley 1 2 Date: 07/27/94 Shippingport,Pennsylvania RI PC Dockets: 50-334,50-412 PWR/W-3-LP,PWR/W-3-LP Subject: BEAVER VALLEY MANAGEMENT CHANGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Mr. Jack Sieber, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, has officially announced his retirement, effective August 1, 1994. A replacement for Mr. Sieber has not been announced. For the interim, the responsibilities of Chief Nuclear Officer will be divided between the three current vice presidents of Beaver Valley: Mr. George Thomas, Vice President, Nuclear Services; Mr. Thomas Noonan, Acting Vice President, Nuclear Operations; and Mr. William Lacy, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Planning and Development. Each will report directly to Mr. Wesley Von Schack, President and Chief Executive Officer of Duquesne Light Company. Mr. Noonan will have primary responsibility for interactions with the NRC. Regional Action: No action required. Contact: Peter Sena (412)643-2000 William Lazarus (610)337-5231 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JULY 27, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Babcock & Wilcox MR Number: 2-94-0067 Naval Nuclear Fuel Division Date: 07/26/94 Lynchburg,Virginia Telecon from SRI Dockets: 07000027 License No: SNM-42 Subject: ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC) Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 12:18 pm EDT, the licensee activated the EOC (as a conservative measure) to provide manning to assess and control a spill in Uranium Recovery. The activation was terminated 1:25 pm. A break occurred in a 1 inch PVC recirculation line for one of the four Aqueous Waste (raffinate) column systems in Uranium Recovery. Some of the spill ran under a door to an asphalt area and into a storm drain line. Estimates were that 50 gallons total were spilled and that up to 5 gallons ran into the drain. The drain line discharges into a drainage ditch outside of the Protected Area but within the licensee's property. No liquid discharge was found at the end of the pipe, which is a 24" pipe about 400 feet long. After sampling of the spill, the liquid was vacuumed using nuclear poisoned vacuum cleaners and mops. The highest sample contained 0.007 grams uranium per liter. Because the pH of the liquid is less than 2 (pH<2), an offsite release would be considered an EPA hazardous material release so the licensee is evaluating flushing the line and collecting the discharge. Preliminary evaluation of the spill identified the failure occurred in the recirculation pipe wall where it was threaded to make a connection to a valve. The cause is still being evaluated. No offsite release, personnel contamination or injury occurred. The licensee made no reports or notifications to offsite agencies. The Senior Resident Inspector responded to the EOC activation. Regional Action: A radiation specialist is onsite and is reviewing the release. The Senior Resident will follow the licensee's actions on the leak. Contact: G. TROUP (404)331-5566 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JULY 27, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Southern California Edison & San MR Number: 4-94-0070 Diego Gas & Electric Co. Date: 07/27/94 San Onofre 2 3 Licensee call to WCFO San Clemente,California Dockets: 50-361,50-362 PWR/CE,PWR/CE Subject: ELECTRICAL FAULT IN CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: At 2 a.m. on July 27, 1994, Unit 3 operators were increasing load on Train A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 3G002 for a semiannual surveillance test. The Volts Amps Reactive (VAR) indication became erratic and the operators observed smoke and sparks coming from the main control room panel (CR63), from which the diesel was being operated. Small flames were observed. The operators tripped the diesel and extinguished the overheated components in the rear of the panel within 2 minutes. EDG 3G002 was declared inoperable. Subsequent investigation revealed overheating damage to one of the power supplies to the panel, the EDG VAR display, and the EDG megawatt (MW) display. In addition, a 100 percent ground was indicated on Train A, 125 V DC Bus 3D1. At approximately 7 to 8 a.m. the ground was identified as in the EDG 3G002 output breaker differential current lockout relay, which was isolated. Prior to the event, Qualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS) B was out of service for maintenance. During the event, QSPDS A indication was lost (powered from DC bus 3D1). Loss of both channels of QSPDS, along with the failed power supply, disabled all indication of voltage on one of the Train A Class 1E 4.16 KV buses (3A04). Due to loss of voltage indication for Bus 3A04, the licensee entered TS 3.8.1.1.b, which requires a unit shutdown within 12 hours, with one EDG and one offsite circuit inoperable. The licensee also stated that they entered TS 3.8.1.1.a1 for Unit 2, which requires a unit shutdown within 72 hours for loss of the Unit 3 Bus 3A04 (an alternate source for Unit 2). The licensee reset and reenergized QSPDS B, regained voltage indication, and exited these 12-hour and 72-hour action statements at approximately 5:30 a.m. The licensee has declared EDG 3G002 inoperable and remains in a 72-hour action statement for this EDG. Portions of Control Room Panel CR63, with indications for EDG 3G002, remains deenergized while the licensee completes their assessment of the damage. No emergency event classification was made due to the short duration of the fire. During the event, the licensee also received a Core Protection Calculator (CPC)/Control Element Assembly Calculator (CEAC) alarm. The licensee believes that this alarm was received due to fluctuations on DC Bus 3D1, which affected the DC to AC inverter which feeds CPC\CEAC. The licensee checked and reset this alarm and is checking the cause of the alarm. Regional Action: The resident inspector was notified and responded to the control room. The resident inspectors will monitor licensee cause determination and corrective actions. The licensee plans to submit a voluntary 50.72 report. Contact: D. Acker (510)975-0315 J. Sloan (714)492-2641