Headquarters Daily report

                         JULY 14, 1994

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                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED
HEADQUARTERS                           X                   
REGION I                               X                   
REGION II           X                                      
REGION III          X                                      
REGION IV                              X                   
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PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - REGION II  JULY 14, 1994

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Florida Power & Light Co.              MR Number: 2-94-0058
Saint Lucie 2                          Date: 07/14/94
Florida                                                                   
Dockets: 50-389
PWR/CE                                

Subject: FAILURE OF TRIP CIRCUIT BREAKER (TCB) 5 TO OPEN                 
                                                                         
Reportable Event Number: N/A

Discussion:

On July 14, Reactor Protection System (RPS) logic testing resulted in a  
failure of Trip Circuit Breaker (TCB) 5 to open upon receipt of an open  
signal from the monthly RPS logic surveillance.  Operators attempted to  
open the subject TCB from the control room and locally without success.  
TCB 5 is one of 8 TCBs employed to trip the reactor in response to an RPS
trip signal.  The TCBs are General Electric models AK-2-25. TS 3.3.1,    
Table 3.3-1, requires that 4 channels (consisting of 2-TCB pairs forming 
a one-out-of-two-taken twice reactor trip logic scheme) be operable in   
Modes 1 and 2.  The applicable action statement requires that an         
inoperable channel be placed in a tripped condition to allow continued   
operation.  The licensee opened TCB 1 which, with TCB 5, forms one       
channel.  The licensee also opened TCB's 2 and 6.  Opening TCB 6 had the 
effect of electrically isolating TCB 5 and placing the TCB trip logic    
into a 1-out-of-2-taken-once reactor trip logic scheme.  The licensee    
considered these actions to have satisfied TS requirements.  A unit      
shutdown was commenced at approximately 0750 to allow TCB 5 to be removed
and inspected.  The licensee intends to be off-line by 1200. Restart has 
not been scheduled and will depend upon the results of an inspection of  
TCB 5.                                                                   
                                                                         
Unit 1 TCB's were last tested satisfactorily on July 7, 1994.            

Regional Action:

Resident Inspectors are following the licensee's actions.                

Contact:  K. LANDIS                  (404)331-5509
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - REGION III  JULY 14, 1994

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Commonwealth Edison Co.                MR Number: 3-94-0126
Dresden 1 2 3                          Date: 07/12/94
Morris,Illinois                        VIA PHONE CALL FROM LICENSEE       
Dockets: 50-010,50-237,50-249
BWR/GE-1,BWR/GE-3,BWR/GE-3            

Subject: STORM SEWER WATER SAMPLE CONTAINED ELEVATED LEVEL OF TRITIUM    
                                                                         
Reportable Event Number: N/A

Discussion:

On July 12, 1994, the licensee informed the Region that analysis of water
from a storm sewer near the Units 2/3 condensate storage tanks (CSTs)    
identified 465,000 picocuries/liter of tritium, an order of magnitude    
higher than previous samples taken throughout the site. Tentatively, the 
licensee believes the source of the tritium is the "A" CST or associated 
piping. The sampling of the sewer was being conducted as part of the     
licensee's evaluation of the leakage from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool. The
storm sewer drains to the Unit 1 intake canal, a stagnant body of water  
connected to the Kankakee River. A plan to definitively identify the     
source of the leak and repair it is being developed by the licensee.     

Regional Action:

Regional personnel will review: (1) the licensee's offsite dose          
calculation for the unplanned and unmonitored discharge of the tritium,  
(2) the efforts to identify and repair the leak, and (3) the continuing  
evaluation of the leakage from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool.               

Contact:  M. KUNOWSKI                (708)829-9875