Headquarters Daily report JUNE 20, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 20, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Baltimore Gas & Elec Co. MR Number: 1-94-0067 Calvert Cliffs 1 Date: 06/20/94 Lusby,Maryland Dockets: 50-317 PWR/CE Subject: UNIT TRIP AND RESTART Reportable Event Number: 27403 Discussion: At 1:35 a.m. on June 16, 1994, during weekly turbine stop valve testing, 3 stop valves stroked closed, rather than the intended single valve. The resulting steam flow transient caused steam generator levels to shrink, initiating a reactor trip on S/G low levels. The reactor trip caused a turbine trip instead of a turbine trip causing a reactor trip as was erroneously reported in the 50.72 notification (Event # 27403). The reactor was taken critical on the morning of June 17th. The weekly turbine stop valve test was repeated several times at low power (<15%) which would preclude a reactor trip if the malfunction recurred. The malfunction could not be reproduced. The plant resumed power operation on June 17, 1994. Regional Action: Routine followup. Contact: Larry Nicholson (610)337-5128 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 20, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Gpu Nuclear Corp. MR Number: 1-94-0068 Oyster Creek 1 Date: 06/20/94 Forked River,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-219 BWR/GE-2 Subject: LOGGERHEAD SEA TURTLE CAUGHT IN INTAKE Reportable Event Number: 27413 Discussion: On June 19, 1994, at 1:30 p.m. the control room received a report that a Loggerhead Sea Turtle was caught in the intake current in the No. 4 intake bay. The SRI was in the control room when the report was received and immediately went to the intake structure. The licensee extracted the sea turtle by lifting it high enough up the intake trash rack using hand held rakes so an operator could physically grab the sea turtle. The sea turtle was successfully removed at 1:45 p.m. The turtle appeared uninjured and was quite active. Licensee personnel placed the turtle in a large container and sprayed sea water on the turtle and the container to keep the turtle cool. The turtle was also shaded by the licensee. Notification was made to a licensee marine biologist who made arrangements to transport the sea turtle to the New Jersey Stranded Marine Mammal facility in Brigantine, New Jersey. The sea turtle was removed from the Oyster Creek facility at approximately 3:00 p.m. on June 19, 1994. Regional Action: No Additional Followup Contact: John Rogge (610)337-5146 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 20, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Consumers Power Co. MR Number: 3-94-0115 Palisades 1 Date: 06/20/94 Covert,Michigan RIII LAN Dockets: 50-255 PWR/CE Subject: PLANT RESTART FOLLOWING EXTENDED FORCED OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: Plant operators took the reactor critical at 7:08 a.m. (EDT), on June 18, 1994, with the unit synchronized to the grid at 5:46 p.m. (EDT), that same day. This concluded an extensive forced outage that began on February 17, 1994. The plant was initially shut down to repair a through wall leak found on one of two ECCS containment sump outlet check valves. Although associated repairs were completed by the end of March 1994, plant restart was delayed until several important issues identified during an ensuing visit by an NRC Diagnostic Evaluation Team (DET) were resolved. The DET completed their onsite inspections of the licensee on April 22, 1994. Regional and Headquarters personnel followed the licensee's actions to assure that all issues needing resolution prior to plant restart were properly addressed. Regional Action: Resident and regional inspectors were onsite around the clock observing restart activities. Contact: M.E. PARKER (616)764-8971 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 20, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-94-0116 Dresden 1 2 Date: 06/20/94 Morris,Illinois INFORMATION Dockets: 50-010,50-237 BWR/GE-1,BWR/GE-3 Subject: ANNUAL INPO INSPECTION Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: An INPO team consisting of about 16 members will arrive on June 20, 1994, for the periodic evaluation of the D. C. Cook plant. The evaluation will continue through July 1, 1994. Regional Action: Information Only Contact: WAYNE KROPP (708)829-9633 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III JUNE 20, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Region Iii MR Number: 3-94-0117 Region Iii Date: 06/20/94 Lisle,Illinois Subject: UKRAINIAN SCRNS STAFF VISIT TO REGION III Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On June 20, 1994, four members of the Ukrainian State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety arrived at the Region III office. The purpose of the visit is to receive training from the staff in materials licensing. They will be in the Region through June 24. Regional Action: N/A Contact: KEVIN NULL (708)829-9854 JOHN MADERA (708)829-9834 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JUNE 20, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Nebraska Public Power District MR Number: 4-94-0055 Cooper 1 Date: 06/20/94 Brownsville,Nebraska SRI Dockets: 50-298 BWR/GE-4 Subject: UPDATE ON CURRENT OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: 27295 Discussion: This morning report provides an updated status of the ongoing issues identified at the Cooper Nuclear Station. The licensee has completed load-shed testing for all loads connected to the vital buses, the results are discussed below: - On the Division I vital bus, two 480-volt breakers (supply power to the service air compressor and ventilation fans) failed to trip. The loads represented approximately 260 amps of load at 480 volts. The breaker, which was originally found to be tie-wrapped in a nontripping condition, provided power to MCC N and represented a load of about 45 amps. Therefore, the total load on the Division I vital bus that could not be shed, as designed, was about 305 amps. The licensee stated that the margin (the difference between design load and actual load) for Diesel Generator I was approximately 250 amps. The licensee has stated that a revision to the diesel generator calculation will be performed to remove some conservatism and, as a result of these efforts, the calculation will show that the actual load, even with the three breakers not tripping open, will not exceed the design load of the diesel. The licensee has not yet completed revision of the calculation. - On the Division II vital bus, two 480-volt failed to open within the specified acceptance criteria. The total loads supplied by the two breakers is about 95 amps. The margin for the Division II diesel generator is about 220 amps. In addition to the two 480-volt breakers, the 4160-volt supply breaker for the emergency failed to open. This breaker is interlocked with the diesel output breaker and must open for the diesel output breaker to close. Failure of the breaker to open will prevent the diesel generator from automatically loading onto the vital bus. Licensee management has agreed that the previous testing performed on the control room envelope did not take into account the pressure in the buildings that connect to the control room envelope. As a result, previous surveillance testing may not have been adequate to provide assurance of the operability of the control room pressure boundary. Licensee management has agreed to reperform the envelope testing in a manner to ensure that the testing is done with all ventilation systems operating at the design basis values. The testing has not yet been scheduled by the licensee. In addition, the licensee, in conjunction with NRR and Region IV, is attempting to establish the design basis value for the control room envelope pressure. These discussions are currently ongoing. In response to an escalated Notice of Violation, the licensee committed to walk down all containment penetrations to verify that each penetration was properly installed and that testing was appropriately performed. As a result of the walkdowns, the licensee has identified 99 of approximately 290 penetrations that contain deficiencies in either the installation or testing. The licensee is currently in the process of resolving the deficiencies. In addition, the licensee committed to verify that the equipment or components attached to the penetrations are properly tested to design basis postaccident pressure (58 psig). During this review, the licensee identified 15 pressure switches that had not been tested, during the performance of the integrated or local leak rate tests, to 58 psig. The licensee is in the process of establishing a test schedule for these pressure switches. A Confirmatory Action Letter, Revision 1, was issued, on June 16, 1994, to require the licensee to meet with the NRC prior to startup from the current outage. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the above issues and to provide assurance that the Cooper Nuclear Station is safe to continue operation. Regional Action: Routine followup. Contact: P. H. Harrell (817)860-8250