Headquarters Daily report MAY 18, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I MAY 18, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: State Of New York MR Number: 1-94-0057 State Univ Of New York At Buffalo Date: 05/18/94 Buffalo,New York Dockets: 05000057 License No: R-77 2000 KW PULSTAR Subject: DISCONTINUANCE OF OPERATION Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: The State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo announced that it will cease operations at the Buffalo Materials Research Center research reactor on June 30, 1994. The reactor is a 2 MW PULSTAR design used for gamma and neutron irradiation studies of materials. The reactor will be operated at low power to complete the current projects prior to the shutdown. A contractor is already on site to begin removal of NRC-owned equipment associated with previously completed NRC-funded research. An inspection by Region personnel is planned for June to review the removal of the equipment, preparations for the reactor shutdown and transition to a possession-only status. Contact: Tom Dragoun (610)337-5373 Jim Joyner (610)337-5370 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MAY 18, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-94-0097 Lasalle 1 Date: 05/18/94 Marseilles,Illinois Dockets: 50-373 BWR/GE-5 Subject: unexpected primary containment isolation valve closure Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 17, 1994 at approximately 2:00 a.m., the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction valve (common to both normal shutdown cooling loops) unexpectantly closed during division II response time testing. One of these loops was already manually isolated elsewhere to support the testing. The automatic action was caused by restoration of power during the test which actuated leak detection logic for RHR room temperature. The leak detection logic had incorrectly not been in bypass during the test and the surveillance procedure did not address bypassing of this logic. Upon loss of the normal shutdown cooling system, shutdown cooling continued to be provided by the licensee's designated alternate shutdown cooling method as it was already in operation. The licensee restored normal shutdown cooling in 22 minutes (after verifying the system remained filled and vented). No temperature rise was noted. The alternate method consisted of fuel pool cooling with the fuel pool gate to the reactor cavity removed, reactor cavity flooded and the reactor vessel head removed. The Unit has been shut down for two months and fuel reload just recently completed. The licensee had previously performed calculations in accordance with technical specifications to verify adequate heat removal capability under existing conditions with this alternate method. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will follow up on the root cause and corrective actions for this actuation. Contact: H.B. CLAYTON (708)829-9602 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MAY 18, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Texas Utilities Electric Co. MR Number: 4-94-0045 Comanche Peak 1 2 Date: 05/17/94 Glen Rose,Texas Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-445,50-446 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: CRACKED WELDS IN CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 12, the resident inspector, while performing a system walkdown, identified a leak in the Unit 2 containment spray system. The leak was from a weld connecting a 3/4-inch relief line to the 12-inch suction header for Containment Spray Pump 2-02. The licensee repaired the leak by removing the weld and replacing it. Additional support was provided for the 3/4-inch line to the relief valve, and the system was reviewed for additional similar configurations that may exhibit similar problems. Dye penetrant tests on similarly configured piping did not identify any additional deficiencies. The removed weld was sent to a metallurgical laboratory for failure analysis. On May 17, another cracked weld in the containment spray system was identified by the licensee. While running Containment Spray Pump 2-02 for taking vibration measurements, an auxiliary operator observed a leak at the weld connecting a pressure transmitter sensing line to the Pump 2-02 discharge header. Current plans were for the licensee to repair this weld and perform a comprehensive review of vibrational data to ensure the problem is adequately scoped and that the corrective actions adequately bound the problem. Similar weld cracking occurred during preoperational testing and initial licensed operation of Unit 2. At that time, the licensee determined the primary root cause to have been that branch connections and modified vendor piping attached to pumps and pump process pipe systems were not adequatly supported for vibration loads. The licensee measured the vibration at locations with similar piping configurations in the Unit 2 containment spray system to determine if the vibration was within allowable specifications. Several locations were identified where the measured vibration exceeded calculated allowable values and supports were reengineerined and installed as required. Vibration testing was reperformed and data obtained indicated satisfactory piping restraint. The licensee is currently in Mode 5 making preparations to enter Mode 4. The operability of the containment spray system is a Mode 4 restraint. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's activities and the licensee's corrective actions will be evaluated prior to Mode 4 entry. Contact: T. Reis (817)860-8185 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MAY 18, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Nebraska Public Power District MR Number: 4-94-0046 Cooper 1 Date: 05/16/94 Brownsville,Nebraska SRI Telecon Dockets: 50-298 BWR/GE-4 Subject: UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP DEVICE MANUALLY DEFEATED Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 16, 1994, a licensee contract individual, while performing fuse and fuse holder labeling activities inside a nonsafety-related motor control center (MCC), noted that the undervoltage trip device for the MCC "N" supply breaker was tie wrapped in a manner that the trip device would not perform its intended function. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the safety-related emergency busses are stripped of all loads before the emergency diesel generator is placed on the bus, and then only essential loads are sequenced back onto the bus. The inoperable trip device would have prevented the load shedding of MCC "N." Based on the licensee's review, it appears that the tie wrap was installed during the 1993 refueling outage when maintenance was performed on the MCC supply breaker. This is done so that the breaker can be shut for testing. The procedure used by the craftsman requires installation of the tie wrap; however, no procedure step exists to instruct the craftsman to remove the tie wrap. The tie wrap was removed shortly after discovery. The licensee completed an analysis that indicated that the additional MCC "N" loads on the emergency bus would not have affected the emergency diesel generator's capability to perform its intended design function. Regional Action: A special inspection will be conducted by the Regional office to review this event. Contact: P. Harrell (817)860-8250