Headquarters Daily report MAY 05, 1994 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X *************************************************************************** PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II MAY 5, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Tennessee Valley Authority MR Number: 2-94-0033 Browns Ferry 1 2 3 Date: 05/05/94 Decatur,Alabama Dockets: 50-259,50-260,50-296 BWR/GE-4,BWR/GE-4,BWR/GE-4 Subject: EARTHQUAKE REPORTED IN NORTHERN ALABAMA Reportable Event Number: N/A Discussion: On May 4, 1994, at approximately 8:40 a.m., CDT, the Shift Supervisor at Browns Ferry received a call from the NRC Operations Officer informing TVA that an earthquake had occurred at 4:12 a.m., CDT, some 31 miles southwest of the plant. The earthquake measured 3.0 on the Richter scale and was centered at Latitude 34.2 N, Longitude 87.2 W. The licensee did not receive any indication of seismic activity in the control room at the time of the event (i.e., no alarms were received, and no one reported "feeling" the earthquake). Subsequent to receiving this information, plant instrumentation personnel checked the triaxial time history accelerographs (TTHAs, the plant's most sensitive seismic instrumentation, which alarms at 0.009 G) for indication of any motion at the station. None of the three TTHAs were in alarm, indicating no detection of seismic activity. These instruments are located in the Unit 1 reactor building base slab, the Unit 1 reactor building floor slab, and the diesel generator building base slab. Regional Action: The Resident Inspectors reviewed licensee activities. Contact: Scott Sparks (404)331-5619 PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV MAY 5, 1994 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations Inc. MR Number: 4-94-0042 Waterford 3 Date: 05/04/94 Killona,Louisiana HOO Telecon Dockets: 50-382 PWR/CE Subject: VENTILATION SYSTEM OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS Reportable Event Number: 27206 Discussion: At 8:10 p.m. on May 3, 1994, the licensee implemented their nonconformance/indeterminate analysis process when preliminary investigation results concluded that engineered safety features (ESF) ventilation systems may not operate properly following a loss of power condition. The potential ventilation systems involved include the shield building ventilation systems, the controlled ventilation area systems, the control room emergency filtration systems, and the fuel handling building ventilation systems. This condition was initially discovered during the performance of a loss of power test conducted during the recently completed refueling outage (Refuel 6). During this test, which was conducted to test the ability of Emergency Diesel Generator B to provide backup power and was successfully completed, Train B of shield building ventilation and controlled ventilation area systems tripped soon after power was restored. As the result of this occurrence, the licensee conducted a review of these systems to determine the reason for the trips. The licensee's review of the shield building ventilation system indicates that a time delay relay in the heater control circuits was timing out before the heater temperature controller could gain control of the heaters when power was restored following a loss of power condition. The licensee had modified the heater control circuit following the refueling outage completed in September 1992 (Refuel 5) and, therefore, had not subjected the modified circuitry to the loss of power test that was conducted during that outage. While the licensee has not yet determined the cause of tripping for the controlled ventilation area system or whether this condition exists for the other ventilation systems, there is the potential that these systems could also be affected since this modification was installed in all of the ESF ventilation systems. Since there is no evidence at this time that the other ventilation systems are affected, the licensee considers these systems to be operable. As a conservative measure, however, the licensee has established administrative controls in the form of a dedicated operator to manually reset the heater circuits if an SIAS with a concurrent loss of power were to occur. Regional Action: Resident inspector followup. Contact: T. F. Stetka (817)860-8247